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Abstract
Since Cuba’s independence in 1902, its relationship with the United States has
been unsteady primarily because of Cuba’s opposition to American hegemonic
ambitions and designs, as exemplified by the 1934 Treaty of Relations and the
1902 Platt Amendment. The relations even worsened following Cuba’s revolution
in 1959 which swept Fidel Castro to power and resulted in Cuba’s adoption of
communist ideology and the nationalization of American owned businesses in
1961. In reaction to these hostile moves, the United States severed diplomatic
relations with Cuba as well as imposed a trade embargo. These developments
however, pushed Cuba deeper into the Soviet orbit. This paper reviews events
leading to and resulting from the passage of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act.

Introduction
Over the years, American foreign relations and policy have been characterized as
shifting from periods and states of revolution and isolation to cooperation. These
were the cases with respect to the United States’ relations with the Soviet Union,
China, and Vietnam. The same is however unfolding in terms of U.S.-Cuba
relations, where the situation has moved from a state of conflict to a new form of
rapprochement. The Republic of Cuba is an island nation occupying an area of
about 44,200 square miles. It is bounded in the north by the United States; in the
south by Jamaica; in the east by Haiti; and in the west by Mexico—all across bodies
of water. With its capital at Havana, the island state is ringed by the Caribbean Sea
in the South; the Atlantic Ocean in the East, and the Gulf of Mexico in the west.
Following the victory of Fidel Castro’s Cuban revolution in January 1959, the
communist manifesto (Party platform), which formed the ideological underpinnings
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of the failed revolutionary movements of 1933 and 1940 was resurrected. It should
be noted that the 1940 constitution banned the commercial ownership of landed
estates and also discouraged ownership of land in Cuba by foreign elements. In
1976, a new Cuban constitution was born under the tutelage of Fidel Castro. Castro,
who installed a communist rule in Cuba, incorporated most of the ideological
elements envisioned in the Cuban revolutionary document, the constitution of 1940.
Since 1959, Cuba has remained a loyal ally of the Soviet Union. As its caretaker in
the American hemisphere, Cuban oil supplies were subsidized by the Soviets until
the end of the cold war in the early 1990s. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in the 1990s, the price of oil rose dramatically. This forced Cuba to reexamine her
economic policy. In 1993, Cuba adopted a new economic philosophy, dubbed
“dollarization” complimented by an economic form of liberalism that encouraged
foreign investment and decentralized state-owned companies.
One of the cornerstones of the 1976 constitution was repression of freedom for
all those who opposed the revolution. Although Cuba remained in the Soviet orbit
or sphere of influence, it consistently ran an independent foreign policy outside the
control of the Kremlin. In other words, Cuba’s foreign policy was dictated by its
national interest. This conclusion could be drawn by virtue of its membership and
active participation in the nonaligned movement.
The history of U.S.-Cuba relations has been long and unsteady. It all began in
1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War, when vanquished Spain surrendered
and signed over its rights to its colonial territory, Cuba, over to the United States.
Thereafter, the United States granted independence to Cuba on the ground that it
retained the right to intervene in the affairs of Cuba and the other possessions if
necessary or when justified, and that it be granted perpetual lease on its naval base
at Guantanamo Bay. It was not until the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 by Fidel
Castro and his band of revolutionaries that overthrew the government of Fulgencio
Batista, and suffered under the U.S.-imposed arms embargo of 1958 that the
conditions deteriorated for the worse. But, reluctantly, the United States recognized
the Castro regime anyway.
Regardless, Castro in 1960 pursued a new policy of seizing private land, and
the nationalization of many private multinational companies most of which were
local subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, and resulting in the severance of diplomatic
relations with the United States. This deep economic and diplomatic isolation
eventually pushed Cuba under Castro further into Soviet orbit and resulted in
expanded trade with the Soviet Union.
Although U.S.-Cuban relations never ended, it rather took on low-intensity and
covert life of its own with respect to attempts to undermine, overthrow, or even kill
Castro. All these attempts reached their climax in the Bay of Pigs incident of April
1961, a failed attempt by the United States to overthrow Castro using armed Cuban
rebels and exiles in an operation dubbed “Mongoose.” The consequence was that
Castro immediately felt the need for a powerful ally, the Soviet Union that would
help provide its urgently needed security.
The new Cuban-Soviet military and diplomatic intercourse soon resulted in the
establishment of Soviet missile bases in Cuba and leading to the Cuban Missile
Crisis of October 1962. The danger and threat posed by Soviet military presence in
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the hemisphere led President Kennedy to impose a naval blockade of Cuba in order
to prevent further Soviet shipment of offensive military weapons to the island
nation. The brinksmanship between Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and
Kennedy ended when Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy’s secret proposal to
remove U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for American assurances that it would
not invade Cuba. It is worth noting that in 1962, American Jupiter missiles were
stationed in Turkey, which was well in Soviet sphere of influence. Through this
“linkage” political strategy, the Soviet Union achieved a proportionate response to
the missiles in Turkey while at the same time making the United States be more
accommodating and flexible on other bilateral and global concerns such as the
erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.
Another explosive issue in the U.S.-Cuba relations came in April 1980
resulting from a near-collapse of Cuban economy. Thousands of dissatisfied Cubans
in search of political freedom and jobs sought political asylum in the United States.
Castro on the other hand, used the opportunity of the mass emigration to empty its
jails filled with criminal inmates and mental- hospital patients. Cuba also adopted a
lukewarm policy attitude to the plight of those who wanted to leave the Island and
migrate to the United States. In this massive effort known as “Mariel Harbor
Boatlift”, thousands of Cubans made their way in a mass flotilla to Miami, Florida,
causing great anxiety among the American populace whose jobs were up for grabs.
Deafening calls then arose in United States Congress to punish Cuba for creating a
refugee problem.
The incident in February 1996 resulted in the downing of two U.S. civilian
“Brothers to the Rescue” aircraft accused of dropping leaflets over Cuban territory
and violating Cuba’s airspace was the trigger that resulted in the imposition of the
Helms-Burton Act of 1996. The account by Crossette (1996) showed that Cuba
claimed that the incident that resulted in the downing of 2 aircraft occurred 9
nautical miles outside Cuban airspace. Another report by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) concluded that the authorities in Cuba had earlier
notified U.S. authorities of multiple violations of its airspace by the “Brothers to the
Rescue” group in the previous year; and that as a follow-up to their complaints, U.S.
authorities had issued public statements advising and warning the group of the
potential dangers and consequences of their unauthorized entry into Cuban airspace
in violation of Cuba’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Another issue of contention between the United States and Cuba involved Elian
Gonzalez who was sent back to his father in Cuba from Miami against the will of
his mother and the Cuban community. Gonzalez, in the company of his mother and
stepfather, had tried to escape to the United States; and were rescued by U.S. Coast
Guard when their boat capsized. Elian was ordered by U.S. courts to rejoin his father
in Cuba after many protracted court battles to effect his stay in the United States.
In this paper, the Helms-Burton Act and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act will be used interchangeably. The purposes of the paper are as
follows:
a.

Examine the nature of Cuban-American relations from Cuban
independence through the Cold War to the present.
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b.
c.
d.
e.

Explore the events leading to the passage of Helms-Burton Act of 1996,
also known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.
Analyze the provisions of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1996.
Discuss the attitudes of subsequent U.S. administrations toward the Act.
Predict the future of U.S.-Cuba relations in the context of the HelmsBurton Act of 1996.

History of Tangled US-Cuba Relations
Following the Cuban revolution of January 1959, Fidel Castro established a
nationalist government antagonistic to American foreign policy designs in Central
America. At the root of the anti-American sentiments in Cuba was the Platt
Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of 1901 that went into effect during the
presidency of Theodore Roosevelt.
The United States fought for Cuban independence from Spain in the SpanishAmerican War of 1898. In the war, the United States defeated Spain, which gave
up all claims to Cuba and ceded it to the United States. Cuba became independent
in 1902 with Tomas Estrada Palma as its president. Following the resignation of
Estrada in 1906, the United States occupied Cuba between 1906 and 1909 in the
wake of a rebellion led by Jose Miguel Gomez. In 1909, Gomez became president
following the election supervised by the United States. However, his government
was tarnished by excessive government corruption. In 1933, Gerardo Machado was
overthrown in a coup led by Fulgencio Batista, and later toppled by Fidel Castro in
1959.
In 1902, the year of Cuban independence, Congress passed the Platt
Amendment which conferred on the United States, a caretaker role in Cuba. The
Amendment, which later became part of the treaty between the United States and
Cuba, gave the United States access to naval bases in Cuba; and the right to
intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs when necessary. According to Bailey (1964),
the purpose of the Platt amendment was to make Cuba a quasi-protectorate of the
United States. This was intended because of America’s fear that Germany might
secure a foothold in Cuba, thus threatening not only the isthmian lifeline, but all of
Latin America, and the shores of the United States. The Platt Amendment had many
provisions beyond keeping the island under U.S. protection and the right to
intervene in Cuban affairs.
First, it barred Cuba from entering into any treaty that would compromise its
independence or permit a foreign power like Germany to secure a base on the island.
Second, it prohibited Cuba from incurring debt that could provoke foreign invasion
because of its inability to pay. Furthermore, the Amendment obligated the United
States to intervene in Cuba for the purpose of maintaining order and Cuban
independence. Also, it allowed the United States to operate a sanitation
(environmental) program of eradicating yellow fever. Finally, it forced Cuba to sell
or lease sites for naval and coastal stations to America. Guantanamo thus became
the principal American base. (Bailey 1996). In 1934, the Platt Amendment was
repealed. By then the United States had not only intervened militarily in Cuba three
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times, but had established a naval base at Guantanamo Bay, which had endured as
a primary source of confrontation between the two nations during the Cold War.
By 1960, Cuban Communism had posed a menace to American dominance in
Central America, with no room for reconciliation. In an exercise to reinstate his
Cuban policy, on January 26, 1960, President Eisenhower released a five-point
American policy toward Cuba. According to Congressional Digest (1960),
Eisenhower stated that the U.S. government would:
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

Adhere strictly to the policy of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of
Cuba.
Prevent illegal acts in territories under its jurisdiction directed against other
governments.
View with increasing concern the tendency of the Cuban government to create
the illusion of aggressive acts and conspiratorial activities aimed at the Cuban
government and attributed to the United States officials or agencies.
Recognize the right of the Cuban government and people in the exercise of
their national sovereignty to undertake those reforms which, with due regard
to their obligations under international law, they may think desirable.
Believe that U.S. citizens had made constructive contributions to the
economies of other countries by means of their investments and their work in
those countries; and would continue to bring to the attention of the Cuban
Government any instances in which the rights of its citizens have been
disregarded.

The president stated also, that the United States government and people would
continue to assert and to defend, in the exercise of their own sovereignty, their
legitimate interests. He further said that it was the hope of the United States
government that differences of opinion between the two governments in matters
recognized under international law be subject to diplomatic negotiations. In the
event that disagreements between the two governments should persist, it would be
the intention of the United States government to seek solutions through other
appropriate international procedures.
Shortly after these conciliatory policy statements for peaceful coexistence were
pronounced, the Cuban government alienated the United States by signing an
agreement for collaboration with the Soviet Union. The Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation was signed on February 13, 1960, between President Fidel Castro and
Soviet first Prime Minister Anastas I. Mikoyan. Next, the two heads of government
signed a contract for the purchase of Cuban sugar by the Soviet Union. In reaction
to this event, the Commerce Department revoked licenses for American exportation
of helicopters to Cuba. This decision went into effect, despite Cuban protests
against American action.
Hence, President Eisenhower planned the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion in
April 1961. He had issued orders to train a small force of Cuban exiles in March
1960 to invade Cuba and topple the Castro regime. When President Kennedy came
into office, he pursued the Eisenhower plan, which later failed in 1961. The bungled
Bay of Pigs invasion was not taken lightly by Cuba. To further protect itself, Cuba
entered into alliance with the Soviet Union. Under this relationship, Cuba would
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qualify for Soviet military protection. In the fall of 1962, the U.S. intelligence
discovered that the Soviets were building secret ballistic missile sites in Cuba. The
stakes were high as the American tolerance of harboring a strategic threat 90 miles
away from its shores that would deny it any reaction time in the case of Soviet
missile attack grew thinner.
In September 1962, American intelligence confirmed the arrival of Soviet
missiles in Havana. On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy announced a
“quarantine” of Cuba and threatened the Soviets with nuclear retaliation. In the
dramatic confrontation, Soviet President Khrushchev agreed to American demands
that the missiles be dismantled provided that Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.
The United Nations, under the auspices of its Secretary General U Thant, verified
and reported that the Russians had dismantled and shipped back the missiles. In
return, Kennedy promised to lift the blockade against Cuba, and also pledged not to
undertake aggressive actions against Cuba.
One ancillary international issue raised by the Cuban Missile Crisis was that of
aerial intrusion. America’s violation of Cuban airspace soon became a parallel
incident to the U-2 debacle over Soviet territory on May 1, 1960. It should be noted
that it was the U-2 plane over-flight missions that violated Cuban airspace and took
aerial photos of the entire island state that revealed the presence of Soviet surfaceto-air missile sites in Cuba. In such military exercise, Cuban airspace was violated
many times. Under international law principles, such over-flights are illegal and
justified Cuban military responses to enforce its territorial sovereignty rights. The
only defense of aerial intrusion over Cuba was made by President Kennedy, who
justified his action, on the basis that the national security of the United States was
threatened.
The Cuban missile crisis once again set the stage for future Soviet-American
negotiations, “detente” during the Cold War. Also, the success of this superpower
reconciliation at the height of the Cold War era gave impetus to the application of
linkage politics as a legitimate tactic in international diplomacy. According to Stein
(1980), international linkage politics occurs when a state adopts the policy of
making its course of action concerning a given issue contingent upon another state’s
behavior in a different issue area. As Kamalu (2001) put it, linkage politics is a
means of exerting influence on each of the states involved in disputes as a result of
its relatively weak position to achieve outright regional hegemony. As Wilkenfield
(1973) also noted, implicit in the linkage concept is the notion that at least two
distinct areas of concern exist which in certain circumstances overlap in a way that
events in one sphere of influence affect events in others. From henceforth, not only
did subsequent American administrations fan anti-Cuban sentiments, but they
implemented policies that further kept Cuba in total political, economic, and
cultural isolation.
Total isolationist goal was vigorously pursued under the administration of
Ronald Reagan who saw Cuban communism as a threat to American interests in
Central America and the Caribbean and vowed to contain it. One major American
instrument in Cuban containment was not only to counteract its international
involvement in the third world, but to build global alliance against it by either
denying Cuba its potential allies or extending American military and economic
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support to its enemies. In pursuit of the former objective, the United States
intervened in the Caribbean Island of Grenada in October 1983. It did so under the
auspices of the five members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to
restore order and democracy in Grenada in the wake of a coup in which Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop and several of his cabinet ministers were executed. This
denied Cuba a foothold in Grenada since American intervention halted the
construction of an airport for military use being constructed with Cuban finances
and expertise. The United States had been a vocal critic of Bishop’s leanings to
Cuba, although the invasion was justified on the basis that it was necessary to ensure
the safety of hundreds of American medical students studying on the Island.
Also, the Reagan Administration tried to undermine the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua. The Sandinistas had overthrown Dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979
with Cuban support and arms. Thereafter, they entered into alliance with Cuba.
Despite congressional prohibition of American military assistance to Nicaraguan
Contras under the provisions of the 1982 Boland Amendment, President Reagan
still organized a clandestine sale of arms to Iran and then transferred their profits to
the Contras. The conflict created by this covert activity between late 1985 and 1987
later came to be known as the “Iran-Contra” affair or “Iran-gate”. The Boland
Amendment in effect, limited U.S. government assistance to the Contras in their
attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, while the Iran-gate was a scandal
pertaining to the sale of arms by the Reagan administration without congressional
approval to Iran in order to gain release of American hostages held captive in
Lebanon. Profits accruing from the deal were to be used to fund arms supplies as
well as provide financial support to the Contra guerrillas fighting to overthrow the
government of Nicaragua.
The Cuban-American relations deteriorated much further in the wake of Cuban
rapprochement with Granada. Following Granada’s independence from Britain on
February 7, 1974, Sir Eric Gairy was installed as its first Prime Minister. In 1979,
his government was overthrown in a coup led by Maurice Bishop that steered
Granada away from the American orbit. Thereafter, Cuban influence began to grow.
Signs and symptoms of the Cuban influence in Granada were evidenced by the
growing reliance of Granada on Cuban doctors for the operation of its hospitals and
other healthcare systems. Further complicating matters were the construction and
expansion of the Granada international airport with Cuban engineering, know-how,
and expertise.
On October 19, 1983, Bishop and several of his senior cabinet ministers were
executed in a successful coup attempt led by Bernard Coard and General Hudson
Austin. Perceived as anti-Americans and Cuban sympathizers, the Reagan
administration felt that a unilateral change of government by the United States
would work against long- term American national security and foreign policy
interests and goals in Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, the United States
built a military coalition with many Caribbean nations to intervene in Grenada. The
invasion resulted in the arrest of the coup leaders and the subsequent restoration of
the 1974 Grenada’s constitution pending new election which eventually took place
in December 1974. The American intervention was justified on the pretext that it
was a Cuban-inspired coup; and that it was intended to liberate American citizens
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and students residing in the island. Finally, the invasion culminated in the
installation of Herbert Blaize as Granada’s new Prime Minister on December 3,
1984, along with his new National Party in Granada’s general elections.
In order to build a regional alliance against Cuba, President Reagan proposed
a major economic development initiative, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which
passed Congress in 1982. Among the major elements of the initiative were:
increased economic aid to the region; preferential trade access to American markets
by goods manufactured in the Caribbean (duty-free status); tax breaks and other
incentives to American firms that invest in the Caribbean. According to this
initiative, only nations that agreed to lower duties on imported or exported products
(tariff) from the United States and enter into military alliance with it would benefit
from this relationship. As Bernell (1994) observed, the bitter rivalry between the
United States and Cuba stands out as one of the principal political disputes in the
Western Hemisphere since the Cold War. This relationship has been one of mutual
hostility, and distrust fueled by differences in national interest, political culture,
power, and ideology, and exacerbated by geographic proximity.

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
(The Helms-Burton Act of 1996)
Cuba’s downing of two U.S. planes raised the ante in the Cuban-American relations.
President Clinton condemned the act and received condemnation resolution from
the U.N. Security Council deploring the Cuban action. Furthermore, President
Clinton suspended all charter flights to Cuba indefinitely until the order was
rescinded in March 1998. The presidential (executive) order imposed additional
travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats in the United States. In addition, it limited
visits of Cuban officials to the United States. President Clinton followed with the
authorization of $300,000 payment to each of the families of the four victims. The
money was to be drawn from the account of Cuban assets frozen in the United
States. On December 17, 1997, a U.S. federal judge awarded $187.6 million to the
families of the downed victims. However, Cuba refused to recognize the court’s
jurisdiction on the basis of sovereignty claims. The most significant impact of this
incident is that the tragedy helped to unite the working relationship between a
Democratic president and Republican -controlled congress. Sooner rather than the
latter, a consensus on American foreign policy toward Cuba was formulated. This
policy relied heavily on isolating the island nation by relying on strict economic
sanction. Hence, on March 12, 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act. The act, which is often referred to as the Helms-Burton
Law, was named after its sponsors: Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and
Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana).
The Helms- Burton Legislation was designed to buttress Cuban Democracy
Act (CDA) already promulgated in 1992. The CDA prohibited American
subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba. It also penalized the entry into the
United States of any vessels for the purpose of loading or unloading freight if it had
engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days of its passage. The primary
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purpose of the Helms-Burton law was to tighten the economic screws on Cuba and
forcing it to pursue a path to a democratically elected civilian government.

Key Provisions of the Helms-Burton Act
According to Congressional Digest (1999), the Helms-Burton Law, as enacted on
March 12, 1996, contains three salient features:
1.

2.

3.

Title 1, Section 102 (h) of the Act codifies all existing executive orders and
regulations affecting Cuba and denies American Presidents of any authority
to apply waivers or modify the embargo provisions. Thus, it guarantees a long
lasting sanctions policy toward Cuba even during subsequent American
Administrations.
Title 111 of the law permits American citizens whose property were
confiscated in Cuba to bring law suits against those who traffic in them in
federal courts for the purpose of collecting monetary damages. It also extends
the right to sue, by Cuban- Americans who acquired American citizenship
after their properties were confiscated. However, it provides the president
with the discretion to delay implementation of the rules for a period of six
months at a time if he determines that such action would serve American
national interest, and also expedite Cuba’s transition to democratic rule.
Title IV of the legislation denies admission to the United States of all those
involved in the confiscation and/ or trafficking of American property in Cuba.
These include corporate officials and shareholders with controlling interests
in any entities involved in the confiscating or trafficking in such property. It
also includes minor, child, spouse, or agent of aliens who would be excludable
under the provision. Although the provision is mandatory, it provides a waiver
on case-by-case basis for travel to the United States for humanitarian medical
reasons or for the purpose of defense in legal actions with respect to the said
confiscated property.

International Reactions and the Praxis of Titles III and IV
Many international entities, including American allies: Japan, Canada, European
Union, and Mexico have reacted negatively to the implementation of the Act. In the
observation of Morici (1977), the above mentioned countries have consistently
maintained that the law’s provisions permitting foreign persons to be sued in
American domestic courts constitute a bad application of the principles of
international law. In contrast, the United States claims that its actions are for the
purpose of promoting its national security interest and preserving its sovereignty
rights in a manner consistent with its obligations under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
With respect to Title III of the Act, President Clinton had, since its passage in
July 1996 suspended for six months the right of those persons benefiting from the
confiscation of American property in Cuba as provided by the Act. The first
suspension was on July 16, 1996. This, according to the Clinton Administration,
would put foreign companies in Cuba on notice regarding their high probability of
both lawsuit and liability claims in the United States’ domestic courts in the future.
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He then announced in a second suspension on January 3, 1997, that he would allow
Title III to go into effect on August 1, 1996, thus allowing liability for trafficking
to take effect on November 1, 1996. The president had justified this second
suspension on the ground that it was necessary as long as American allies continued
their onward march toward democratic governance in Cuba. The president had,
also, continued to suspend the rights to file Title III lawsuits at six-month intervals.
In the case of Title IV of the legislation, the president banned from travel to the
United States a number of executives and their families from many companies for
their dubious role in confiscated American property in Cuba.

Pope John Paul’s Visit and the Clinton Corollary
Pope John Paul II visited Cuba in January 1998. His visit refocused world attention
on the plight of Cuban population because of the effects of American sanctions.
Before departing from Cuba, the Pope appealed to President Clinton to relax or lift
on humanitarian basis, U.S. embargo on Cuba, particularly in the area of food and
medical supplies. The Pope’s comments brought back the American sanctions
policy to the policy agenda of the United States by generating new heated debates
on the merits and disadvantages of sanctions on Cuba. The Papal appeal, thus
culminated in President Clinton’s reexamination of his earlier Four-Point Cuban
policy announced on March 28, 1998. Thus, a deviation from America’s traditional
approach was considered after a series of policy debates in Congress prior to voting
on the Helms-Burton bill.

U.S. Congressional Debate on the Merits of American Sanctions against
Cuba
In the May 7, 1998 testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways
and Means Committee on U.S. Economic and Trade Policy toward Cuba,
Representative John Joseph Moakley (D- Massachusetts), in support of lifting
Cuban sanctions, argued that “the Pope’s visit has done a great deal to teach the
world about Cuba; and thus has put a human face on this most mysterious and
troubling nation. It is time that we lift the embargo on food and medicines and allow
the Cuban People access to the best medical and food supplies. “Our Cuba policy
is 38 years old and it just hasn’t worked. In fact, it is a complete failure.”
(Congressional Quarterly, March 1999, pp 92-94).
Also, Silvia Wilhelm, Executive Director of Cuban Committee for Democracy
argued that “There are countless reports that link the effects of the long standing
U.S. trade embargo to conditions of malnutrition. Politics should never interfere
with the health and nutrition of a people.” (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, pp. 9294). In contrast, Representative Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey) argues that:
“Change in Cuba has occurred as a result of U.S. policy not in spite of it. So long
as Castro dictates the terms of engagement, as he does, engagement itself will not
lead to change in Cuba.” (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, pp. 77-79).
In support of sanctions, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Florida) noted
that despite the claims of those who wish to engage with Castro, U.S. policy is
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working. Ironically, far from removing or reforming the Castro government, the
embargo has served as a convenient scapegoat. Without U.S. sanctions, Castro
would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen its military
capabilities. America must begin now to open channels of influence with the Cuban
people. Let us not be fooled by cosmetics and temporary staged shows of so-called
cooperation.” (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, p. 10).
Francis J. Hernandez, President of Cuban American National Foundation
(CANF), in support of sanctions against Cuba argued that “the time is now to send
a message to the international community on the United States’ seriousness of
purpose in pushing democracy in Cuba. (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, p. 89).
Also, Claudio Benedi, Secretary of Foreign Relations, Cuban Patriotic Board
argued that sanctions against Cuba are necessary because “the current total
imbalance of the Cuban economy is due to the communist system that has
subjugated that country. The Helms-Burton law is for the legitimate defense of
rights and freedoms of which both U.S. and Cuban citizens are deprived. The need
for expulsion of current communist government of Cuba remains. Nothing has
changed” (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, pp. 91-95).
On January 5, 1999, President Clinton announced a five-measure plan to
augment his four-plan policy changes of March 28, 1988.The purpose of the
president’s four-plan policy change was to build on the momentum of Pope’s visit
to Cuba; and to help prepare the Cuban populace for a democratic transition and to
support the role of the Church and other elements of civil society in Cuba. The fourpoint plan changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba announced by President Clinton
were:
1.

2.

3.

4.

The resumption of licensing for direct humanitarian charter flights to
Cuba, which was curtailed after the downing of two U.S. civilian
planes in February 1996.
The resumption of cash remittances up to $300 per quarter for the
support of close relatives in Cuba, which had been curtailed in August
1994 in response to the migration crisis with Cuba.
The development of licensing procedures to streamline and expedite
licenses for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies
and equipment to Cuba.
A decision to work on a bipartisan basis with Congress on the transfer
of food to the Cuban people. (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, p. 73)

Thereafter, a major revision by President Clinton was announced on January 5,
1999. This announcement was partially given impetus by the May 6, 1998 report to
Congress by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency on Cuba’s military threat to the
United States. The report proved reassuring to the United States. It concluded that
Cuba has little or no motivation to engage in any military adventures except for the
purpose of protecting its territorial integrity and national sovereignty; and that the
island state has limited military and intelligence capability to pose any significant
threat to American interests or those of its citizens. The five-point plan stipulates
the following actions:
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1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

To broaden cash remittances to Cuba to include all U.S. residents (not just
those with close relations in Cuba.) to remit up to $300 per quarter to any
Cuban family, and licensing larger remittances by U.S. citizens and nongovernmental organizations to entities independent of the Cuban government.
To expand direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities
other than the current flights from Miami to other Cuban cities other than
Havana.
To re-establish direct mail service to Cuba, suspended in 1962.
To authorize the sale of food to independent entities in Cuba, such as religious
groups and private restaurants; and the sale of agricultural tools to
independent agents such as private farmers and farmer cooperatives
producing food for sale in private markets.
To expand people-to-people contact (public diplomacy) through two-way
exchanges among academics, athletes, scientists, and others. This measure
would, also, allow the Baltimore Orioles baseball team to explore the
possibility of playing exhibition games in Cuba. The Baltimore Orioles finally
played the Cuban national team in April 1999 amid great public controversy
in the United States. (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, p. 72)

The Bush Legacy and Footprint
Upon assuming the Presidency, George W. Bush on July 16, 2002, notified the
congress of his suspension of Title III of the Helms- Burton Act. Title III promotes
the legal actions to be brought against for trafficking in confiscated properties in
Cuba. In its final form, the act allows the president to either waive, or enforce its
provision every six years. It is interesting to note that his predecessor, President
Clinton chose to suspend the Title III throughout his second term in office. President
Bush, however, justified his actions as being designed to promote American
national interest, and expediting the transition of Cuba to multiparty democracy in
the face of strong opposition from its European allies. (Washington File, July 16,
2001). Consequently, on January 16, 2002, President Bush informed the House and
Senate Committees on Appropriations, the House Committees on International
Relations, and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations of his intentions to
suspend for additional six months beyond Feb 1, 2002. (Washington File, January
16, 2002).
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Domestic Political Calculations
Two major political events during the Clinton and Bush Administrations had the
potential to redefine the fate of the Helms-Burton Act. They were the Elian
Gonzalez case of 2000 and the Carter Cuban visit of 2002. Many in the United
States, especially, activists in the Cuban community in Miami, pushed for the boy
to stay in the United States, in honor of his mother’s wishes, but in opposition to
those of Elian’s maternal grandparents and father that he be brought back to Cuba.
As a back drop to this case, Elian was detained by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in violation of its accord with Cuba which requires
that he be denied parole and sent back to Cuba.
Following intense political debate, protests, and litigation, the court in the end
decided that the Justice Department and the INS in particular should send him back
to Cuba; an action that eventually brought the issues to an abrupt end. Nonetheless,
deep -rooted resentment and anger on the part of Cuban- Americans manifested
themselves in the November 2000, presidential elections between George W. Bush
and Al Gore that eventually decided the outcome of the presidency and bound to
influence future local, state, and national elections for years to come. (Washington
File, June 28, 2002).
The next case with grave foreign policy impact on the Helms-Burton Act of
1996 is former President Carter’s Cuba visit in 2002. This trip came amid increasing
criticism of American embargo from members of Congress and business leaders
who have been lobbying to break into Cuban market now dominated by the
Europeans. It should be recalled that under Carter, the United States lifted travel
restrictions on Cuba in 1977; and also established quasi-diplomatic mission in both
countries that at least guaranteed some reasonable levels of contacts after breaking
off full diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1962. The full impacts of Carter’s visit to
Cuba are not far-fetched. First, it led to the release of thousands of prisoners in
Cuba, with Cuban- Americans allowed to travel to Cuba to visit relatives for the
first time. Also, prior to Carter setting foot on Cuban soil, Cuban authorities
unconditionally released Vladimiro Roca, a prominent Cuban dissident in prison
two months before the completion of his five-year prison sentence. Carter also met
with Roca, Oswaldo Paya and Elizardo Sanchez in the last days of his visit. In
addition to Gross, the plights of other prisoners, including those of Rolando Sarraff
Trujillo were raised. Trujillo who worked as an agent for American intelligence was
locked up in Cuban prison for nearly 20 years. By January 2015, all dissidents in
Cuban prisons were released.
Another critical impact of Carter’s visit was his ability to refute charges that
Cuba was developing biological weapons, and had also shared such technology with
“rogue” nations; a suspicion that arose with Cuba’s innovative advances in genetic
engineering, and biotechnology, and other ground-breaking research which
American officials believe threatened U.S. national interest and security, with
respect to proliferation of both nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
According to Cuba, these charges were mere fabrications designed to maintain
American embargo and resist the revocation of the Helms-Burton Act by the U.S.
Congress. Carter’s transparent tour of the Cuban Center for Genetic Engineering
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and Biotechnology with select members of Congress, media, and business leaders
at least, brought such unfounded charges and allegations to a close. However, time
will tell the full impacts of the Carter visit to Cuba on the Helms-Burton Act in
particular and the U.S.-Cuba relations in general. The U.S.-Iraq war of March 2003
and its post -war challenges eventually dominated the American domestic
legislation and foreign policy agenda, thereby relegating the Cuban–American
relations and enforcement of the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 and
related issues to the back burner of America’s international relations. (Whitworth,
2002).

President Barack Obama’s Policy Initiatives in Normalizing
Relations between Cuba and the United States.
From its inception in 2008, the Obama administration announced a series of changes
in U.S. policy. According to the White House Office of the Press Secretary Policy
Brief of April 13, 2009, the Obama new policy rests on the following policy
principles and goals:
Goal 1: To facilitate greater contact between separate family members in the
United States and Cuba and increase the flow of information and humanitarian
resources directly to the Cuban people. As such, the President directed the
Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Treasury to take the needed steps to actualize
them through the following causes of action:
a. Lift restrictions on transactions related to the travel of family members
to Cuba.
b. Authorize U.S. telecommunication network providers to enter into
agreements
to
establish fiber-optic
cable
and
satellite
telecommunications facilities linking the United States and Cuba.
c. License U.S. telecommunications service providers to enter into roaming
service agreements with Cuba’s telecommunications service providers.
d. License U.S. satellite radio and satellite television service providers to
engage in transactions necessary to provide services to customers in
Cuba.
e. License persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to activate and pay U.S. and
third country service providers for telecommunications, satellite radio
and satellite television services provided to individuals in Cuba.
f. Authorize the donation of certain customer-telecommunication devices
without a license.
g. Add certain humanitarian items to the list of items eligible for export
through licensing exceptions.
Goal 2: To increase the flow of remittances and information, Lift all restrictions on
family visits to Cuba, strengthen contacts between Cuban and American people,
increase access of Cubans to resources to create opportunities, as well as promote
and extend American good will to the Cuban people. These values, according to
the Obama Administration would be achieved through the institution of policies
and programs that include:
a. Authorizing remittances to individuals within three degrees of family
relationship (e.g., second cousins) and to allow individuals who share a
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b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

common dwelling as a family with an authorized traveler to accompany
them.
Remove limitations on the frequency of visits.
Remove limits on the duration of a visit.
Authorize expenditure amounts that are the same as non-family travel.
Remove the 44 –pound limitation on accompanied baggage.
Remove restrictions on the amounts and frequency of remittances to a
person’s family member in Cuba.
Authorize Cuba-bound travelers from the United States to carry up to
$3,000 in remittances.
Establish general license for banks and other depository/ financial
institutions to forward remittances.

Goal 3: To expand the scope of humanitarian donations eligible for export through
license exceptions, using the following strategies:
a. Restore clothing, personal hygiene items, seeds, veterinary medicines
and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making
equipment to the list of items eligible to be included in gift parcel
donations.
b. Restore items normally exchanged as gifts by individuals in “usual and
reasonable” quantities to the list of items eligible to be included in gift
parcel donations.
c. Expand the scope of eligible gift parcel donors to include any individual.
d. Expand the scope of eligible gift parcel for beneficiaries to include
individuals other than Cuban Communist Party officials or Cuban
government officials already prohibited from receiving gift parcels, or
charitable, educational, or religious organizations not administered or
controlled by the Cuban government.
e. Increase the value limit on nonfood items to $800.

Relations between Cuba and the United States still remained tenuous into the
second term of Obama’s presidency, but since Fidel Castro stepped down from
official leadership of the Cuban state and Barack Obama became president of the
United States, both countries improved relations somewhat because of the new
faces on both sides.
In April 2009, Obama, who had received nearly half of the Cuban-American
vote in the 2008 presidential election, began implementing a less strict policy
towards Cuba. Obama stated that he was open to dialogue with Cuba, but that he
would only lift the trade embargo provided Cuba underwent political change. In
March 2009, Obama signed into law a congressional spending bill which eased
some economic sanctions on Cuba and relaxed travel restrictions on CubanAmericans (defined as persons with a relative who is no more than three generations
removed from that person traveling to Cuba). The executive decision further
removed time limits on Cuban-American travel to the island. Another restriction
relaxed in April 2009 was in the realm of telecommunications, which would allow
quicker and easier access to the internet for Cuba. The loosening of restrictions in
the sector would likely help to spur joint scientific research in both countries in
terms of working together on issues of mutual concern, such as destruction of shared
biodiversity and in medicine particularly with diseases that affect both populations.
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At the 2009 Summit of the Americas, President Obama signaled the opening of a
new beginning with Cuba.
Obama’s overtures were reciprocated, to some degree, by Cuban President
Raúl Castro, who in July 2012 agreed to hold talks with the United States. In
December 2013, at a state memorial service for Nelson Mandela, Barack Obama
and Raúl Castro shook hands, which symbolized yet a strong prospect for improving
U.S.-Cuba relations. Beginning in 2013, Cuban and U.S. officials held secret talks
brokered in part by Pope Francis and hosted in Canada and Vatican City, to start
the process of restoring diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States.
In December 2014, the framework of an agreement to normalize relations and
eventually end the longstanding embargo was announced by Raul Castro in Cuba
and Barack Obama in the United States. Cuba and the United States pledged to start
official negotiations with the aim of reopening their respective embassies in Havana
and Washington.
As a symbolic gesture and part of the agreement, aid worker Alan Gross and
an unnamed Cuban national working as a U.S. intelligence asset were released by
the Cuban government, which also promised to free an unspecified number of
Cuban nationals from a list of political prisoners earlier submitted by the United
States. In return for its part, the U.S. government released the last remaining Cuban
nationals in its jail. Even though reaction to this change in policy within the CubanAmerican community was mixed, opinion polls indicated the thaw in relations was
broadly popular with the American public.
Under the new rules implemented by the Obama administration, restrictions on
travel by Americans to Cuba were significantly relaxed as of January 2015, and the
limited import of items like Cuban cigars and rum to the United States was allowed,
as was the export of American computer and telecommunications technology to
Cuba. In April 2015, the Obama administration announced that Cuba would be
removed from the United States “Terrorist Sponsor” list. The House and Senate had
45 days to review and possibly block this action and failed to act. As a consequence,
the Obama Administration officially removed Cuba from the United States’ list of
state sponsors of terrorism. This move by President Obama marked a significant
departure by the United States from the Cold War conflicts that strained CubaUnited States relations.

Reinstatement and Normalization of Trade Relations
During the Obama Administration, trade relations between Cuba and the United
States was reactivated. Under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Enhancement Act of
2000, exports from the United States to Cuba particularly food and medical products
are allowed with the proper licensing and permissions from the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the United States Department of the Treasury. The Obama
administration eased specific travel and other restrictions on Cuba in January 2011.
Moreover, the U.S. Congressional delegation including Patrick Leahy (DVermont), Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and Richard Shelby
(R-Alabama), ranking member of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
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Matters; travelled to Cuba as part of a delegation of senators and representatives of
the Congress of United States.
Travel and import restrictions levied by the United States were further relaxed
by executive action in January 2015 as part of the “Cuban Thaw”, a historic
warming of Cuba–U.S. relations that began in December 2014.
In December 2014, Presidents Obama and Castro announced the beginning of
a process of normalizing relations between Cuba and the United States. The
normalization agreement was secretly negotiated with the assistance of Pope
Francis in meetings held in both Canada and Vatican City. It is worth reiterating
that the said agreement required the lifting of U.S. travel restrictions and
remittances, and U.S. banks’ access to the Cuban financial system. The agreement
also required reopening of embassies in Havana and Washington, which closed in
1961 after the breakup of diplomatic relations following the establishment of
Cuba’s close alliance with the Soviet Union.

Swapping of Prisoners
A broad account of the release of prisoners was established by Katel (2015) who
argued that most of the moves to normalize relations between Cuba and the United
States had come from the American side, on the basis that the United States
exclusively made most of the bidding or compromises. A list of American
concessions included:






Releasing from prison 3 members of Cuban spy ring
Loosening restrictions on trade and travel to Cuba
Removing Cuba from “state sponsor of terrorism” list
Expanding the list of goods and products that can be exported to Cuba and
Permitting U.S. travelers to use American credit and debit cards in Cuba

In return, Cuba reciprocated by:




Freeing 53 political prisoners held in Cuba;
Releasing USAID contractor Alan P. Gross; and
Releasing Cuban Intelligence Officer Sarraff Trujillo accused of spying on
Cuba on behalf of the CIA.

The “exchange of prisoners” process was marked by the return of Gross to the
United States in December 2014. As far back as May 2012, it had been reported
that the U.S. had declined a “spy swap” proposed by the Cuban government,
wherein the remaining group of convicted Cuban spies in prison in the U.S. since
the 1990s, would be returned to Cuba in exchange for USAID contractor Alan
Phillip Gross. Gross had been imprisoned in Cuba on charges of illegally providing
computer equipment, satellite phones, and internet access to Cuba’s Jewish
community without a permit required under Cuban law. The prisoner swap marked
a major strategic foreign policy shift by the United States towards Cuba since the
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imposition of the embargo in 1962, and also removed a key obstacle to the
normalization of bilateral relations between Cuba and the United States.

Relaxation of Travel and Trade Restrictions
Although the Cuban trade embargo can only be ended by the U.S. Congress, the
Obama administration took executive action to substantively ease restrictions on
travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens, as well as restrictions on the import and export of
goods between the two countries. In his 2015 State of the Union Address to
Congress, Obama, in making the case to the nation called on lawmakers to lift the
embargo against Cuba. In February 2015, Conan O’Brien became the first
American television personality to film in Cuba for more than 50 years.
Also, in February 2015, American Major League Baseball began talks about
playing spring training games in Cuba. Furthermore, charter flights between John
F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City and José Martí International
Airport in Havana, operated by Sun Country Airlines, began in March 2015. In May
2015, the United States gave approval for companies to offer chartered ferry service
between Miami and Cuba. Similarly, the Cuban government opened the first bank
account in the United States, enabling it to do non-cash business and other
transactions in the United States for the first time since the embargo began.

Bilateral Talks and Diplomacy
Having mutually identified the opening of diplomatic embassies in both capitals
(Havana and Washington, D.C.), bilateral talks on the matter proceeded in January
2015. The U.S. delegation was led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Roberta
Jacobson, and Josefina Vidal Ferreiro, Cuba’s head of North American affairs. The
talks focused on migration policy. In particular, Cuban representatives urged the
United States to end its immigration privileges to Cuban refugees as governed by
the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, also known as the wet foot, dry foot policy.
According to Reynolds (2011) and Arteaga, (2008), this policy would allow any
fleeing Cuban citizens U.S. residency and later citizenship, as long as they were
found on U.S. soil and not at sea. The act essentially says that anyone who fled
Cuba and entered the United States would be allowed to pursue residency a year
later. Under the Clinton administration, the United States came to an agreement
with Cuba that the former would stop admitting people found at sea. Since then, a
Cuban caught on the waters between the two nations (with “wet feet”) would
summarily be sent home or to a third country except those who make it to shore
(“dry feet”) who would get a chance to remain in the United States, and later would
qualify for expedited “legal permanent resident” status and would then eventually
qualify for U.S. citizenship.
Uncertainty about the status of U.S. immigration policy was known to promote
a surge of emigrants fleeing Cuba for the United States in order to beat the deadline
for anticipated policy reforms by the American Congress through enactment or
presidential executive order. It should be noted that all this was happening in the
context of heated debate in the United States that the wet foot/, dry foot policy was
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racially discriminatory as it allowed only Cuban immigrants and refugees to be
processed and resettled in the United States in contrast to Haitians who were
rounded up and sent back or repatriated to Haiti by the U.S. Coast Guard and
immigration authorities. Despite Cuban objections, the United States stated that it
would stand by its Cuban migration policy under the Cuban Adjustment Act. The
next item of discussion in the U.S.-Cuba agenda was the issue of Cuba’s listing
among state “sponsors of terrorism” by the U.S. government, a matter that remained
a significant sticking point, according to Cuba, arguing that its removal was a
precondition to reopening embassies. Following the Obama and Castro meeting in
the Summit of the Americas in Panama, Castro once again called for the reopening
of the embassies between the two countries. High-level diplomats from Cuba and
the United States met in Havana, Cuba, in January 2015. As a consequence,
President Obama announced that formal diplomatic relations between Cuba and the
United States would resume with the opening of embassies in Washington and
Havana respectively; a promise that eventually came to realization on July 20, 2015.

Removing Cuba from the Blacklist
Removing Cuba from the black-list – states designated as “terrorist sponsors”
though important to Cuba, would legally free the U.S. government to do business
with Cuba. Cuba was one of the countries on the list, the others being Iran, North
Korea, and Syria. President Obama informed the U.S. Congress that he had decided
to lift the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism on the ground that:



The government of Cuba had not provided any support for international
terrorism during the preceding six-month period; and
Cuba had provided assurances that it would not support acts of international
terrorism in the future.

Under American law, the U.S. Congress could prevent the removal of Cuba’s
designation by passing legislation within 45 days of presidential request. If
Congress failed to pass such legislation within this window or time frame, Cuba
would automatically be removed from the U.S. list of “state sponsors of terrorism”.
However, Congress failed to act, and the lapse in congressional action on the matter
eventually cleared the way for Cuba to be officially removed from the list in May
2015.
According to Schectman (2015) and Daugherty (2015), the U.S. Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed Cuban
companies, boats and persons from its list of entities linked to terrorism and drug
trafficking. The OFAC list sometimes referred to as the “Clinton List” prohibited
individuals and organizations from doing business with the United States. The
affected parties or business entities included select shipping, fishing, and tourist
companies and vessels, most of which were based in and operated out of Panama.
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The Unsettled Issue of Guantanamo Bay
The issue and controversy over Guantanamo Bay still remained the thorny and
unresolved threat to the full normalization of relations between the United States
and Cuba. As a reminder, while attending the meeting of Latin American leaders in
San José, Costa Rica, President Raul Castro insisted that the United States should
return to Cuba, the Guantanamo Bay naval Base and lift the embargo on Cuba
before reestablishment of relations could take place. The White House responded
in dissent, indicating that any such move was out of the question. It should be noted
that President Obama, right during the presidential campaign days in 2008
consistently argued that the prison at Guantánamo Bay should be closed down, but
not the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay. In the argument of international
relations and foreign policy scholars, including Parmly (2013), Guantanamo Bay
has dominated international news cycle because of the 166 detainees of the Iraq and
Afghanistan prisoners of war accused of terrorist activities by the United States who
went on extended hunger strike. Also, the author posited that the 3 major missions
of the Guantanamo base are so critical strategically for the United States to give it
up to Cuba. President Jimmy Carter had faced a similar challenge before he
surrendered the Panama Canal to Panamanian control in December 1999 in
compliance with the Torrijos-Carter treaty. The functions of the base include:
•
•
•

Serving as detention center for U.S. detainees;
Serving as migrant processing facility; and
Serving as a base to ensure long-term U.S. presence in the Caribbean.

Short of recommending an outright surrender of Guantanamo Bay to Cuba,
Parmly (2013) associated America’s presence there as a major hindrance to U.S.
foreign policy goals, interests and objectives by noting that “at the present time, to
almost everyone around the world, evoking the name ‘“Guantanamo’” triggers an
anti-American diatribe” (p. 80).

Summary and Conclusion
Right from Cuba’s independence, its relation with the United States has been
characterized as shaky, unsteady, and at its worst, rocky. A panoply of thorny issues
and tensions have underpinned U.S.-Cuba relations right from Cuba’s
independence in 1902 to President Obama’s normalization of diplomatic relation of
July 20, 2015, when the Cuban and U.S. “interests sections” in Washington and
Havana were upgraded to embassies:



The 1902 Platt amendment, which kept Cuba under American protection and right
to intervene in its domestic affairs, whenever justified including granting
irrevocable lease or right to the Guantanamo Bay
The 1934 Treaty of Relations superseded the 1903 treaty and agreeing to abrogate
the 1903 treaty except that Cuba agreed to continue to recognize as lawful all prior
military actions taken by the United States, and affirmed with certain modifications
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such as leasing of land by the United States for a naval base unless when modified
or abrogated by mutual consent and as regards the Guantanamo Naval Station.
Cuba affirmed its territory unless changed by mutual consent or abandoned or
agreed by the U.S. and agreed to allow the base to be quarantined in time of
contagion (during plague, epidemic, or pandemic disease).
The April 1959 snubbing of Fidel Castro during his official visit to Washington by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s refusal to meet with him but Vice President
Richard Nixon.
The 1961 U.S. backing of abortive invasion by Cuban exiles in the Bay of Pigs
snafu
The 1961 CIA plans to assassinate Castro as part of “Operation Mongoose”
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis surrounding Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in
Cuba
February 1962 embargo against Cuba by President Kennedy
1980 release of hundreds of Cuban convicts and exiles in Mariel boatlift.
1996 Helms-Burton Act which required that embargoes against Cuba not be lifted
until Cuba holds free and fair elections and transition to a democratically elected
government that excluded Fidel or Raul Castro
1996 U.S. trade embargo in response to Cuba’s downing of two U.S. aircraft
operated by Miami-based Cuban exiles
1999 incident in which Elian Gonzalez was repatriated to Cuba to join his father
after a protracted and prolonged court battles in the United States
December 2009 detention of Alan Gross, USAID Subcontractor in Havana accused
of spying for Washington

According to Suddath (2009), the rocky relationship between Cuba and the
United States goes way back before the emergence of Fidel Castro on the political
scene in Cuba. In 1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War, vanquished Spain
surrendered and signed over its rights to its colonial possessions or territories
including Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Guam over to the United States, which later
granted independence to Cuba on the condition that it retained the right to intervene
in the affairs of Cuba and the other possessions if necessary or when justified, and
that it be granted perpetual lease on its naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Hence, the
resentment over America’s colonial legacy has become one of the primary thorny
features in U.S.-Cuba relations for decades.
It was not until the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 by Fidel Castro and his
band of guerillas that overthrew the government of Fulgencio Batista which had
suffered under the U.S.-imposed arms embargo of 1958 that the conditions
deteriorated for the worse. Reluctantly, the United States recognized the Castro
regime. Even though Castro made overtures to the United States after assuming
power by visiting Washington and touring Washington monuments, he was still
snubbed by President Eisenhower who refused to meet with him but leaving it to
then Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Dean Acheson to receive
him. From henceforth, his hostility toward the United States never abated. 1960 saw
the seizing of private land, and the nationalization of many private transnational
(multinational) companies most of which were local subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations. In addition, American products were heavily taxed to the extent that
importation of American consumer products dried up. In response, the Eisenhower

126

Journal of Global Initiatives

Administration imposed trade restrictions on virtually every product except food
and medicine. Decrying what was referred to as “Yankee imperialism,” Castro was
pushed further into Soviet orbit as he expanded trade with the Soviet Union instead,
hence forcing the United States to cut off all diplomatic ties with Cuba, and using
Switzerland as a diplomatic intermediary or proxy. In February 1962, President
Kennedy made the embargo permanent.
However, U.S.-Cuba relations never ended, but took on low-intensity and
covert life, in terms of toppling the Cuban government. After the Bay of Pigs, a
botched or failed attempt by the United States to overthrow Castro using Cuban
exiles, the new approach called “Operation Mongoose”, a series of attempts on
Castro’s life gained ground. As Suddath (2009) reported, there were at least five
plots or attempts on Castro’s life between 1961 and 1963. Castro, realizing the
importance of Soviet Union as “protector” and “caretaker” of Cuba, dived deeper
into Soviet sphere in order to meet its security needs.
Hence, it was not a surprise to learn from U.S. reconnaissance/ spy planes of
the presence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. This event marked the beginning of
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Declaring that any nuclear missile deployment in Cuba
against the United States would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union,
Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba in order to prevent further Soviet
shipment of offensive military weapons to Cuba. As the stakes were raised,
President Kennedy and Soviet leader Khrushchev came to their senses and tried to
avert a nuclear war. This brinksmanship, which is the tendency of political leaders
to pursue dangerous policies to the limits of safety before reaching agreement found
expression in “linkage politics.”
The ordeal ended when Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy’s secret proposal to
remove U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for American assurances that it would
not directly or indirectly through its proxies invade Cuba. In 1962, American Jupiter
missiles were stationed in Turkey, which was well in Soviet backyard. As Swift
(2007) articulated, Soviet-American agreement over the Cuban missile issue would
become a cheap way for the Soviets to offset the American missile advantage; serve
as a deterrence to the invasion of Cuba; a response to the missiles in Turkey, as well
as make the United States more accommodating over other issues, such as the
erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.
In April 1980, as a result of a downturn in Cuban economy, thousands of
dissatisfied Cubans sought political asylum in the United States. Using the
opportunity to empty its jails filled with criminal inmates and mental-hospital
patients, Cuba adopted a lukewarm attitude to the plight of those who wanted to
leave the Island and migrate to the United States. In this massive exodus dubbed
“Mariel Harbor boatlift”, thousands of Cubans made their way in a mass flotilla to
Miami, Florida, and causing great anxiety among the American populace who saw
it as an alien invasion. As a consequence, the United States strengthened its
embargo in 1996 with the Helms-Burton Act, which applied the embargo to foreign
countries that traded with Cuba. The passage of the Act was a retaliatory measure
against Cuba for shooting down two U.S. civilian aircraft that entered Cuban
territorial airspace in January 1996, and releasing leaflets on Cuban territory. Cuba
justified her actions on the ground that they were consistent with international law
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and other conventions. It should be recalled that the release of the leaflets occurred
outside the 12-mile Cuban territorial limit, thus violating her territorial waters and
airspace.
Since Cuba’s revolution in 1959, which swept Fidel Castro to power, its
communist government has been adversarial to the United States. In 1961, Cuba
confiscated or expropriated U.S. owned businesses. This move prompted the United
States to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba and imposed trade restrictions.
The severance of ties, however, pushed Cuba into the Soviet orbit. Under CubaSoviet alliance, the hostility and isolation of Cuba endured for about 50 years.
Under President Obama, a new chapter or page was turned in U.S.-Cuba relations.
This new rapprochement or détente ended up bridging the economic and political
divide between the two nations.
Over the years, many U.S. members of Congress have agreed on a basic goal
of American foreign policy: to steer Cuba to a democratic change. Yet, they have
differed on the appropriate means to achieve it. While some favor the use of
sanctions, others favor the normalization of Cuban-American relations free of
economic sanction. In the post- Cold War period, the 104th Congress (1995 and
1996) paid special attention to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act,
enacted in the aftermath of the downing by Cuba of two U.S. civilian planes in
February 1996. The legislation, which was sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms (RNorth Carolina) and Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana), provided a number of
elements to increase pressure on the Cuban government including:




Strengthening and continuing U.S. embargo
Inviting, organizing, and coordinating international sanctions against the
Castro regime and
Supporting transition to a democratically elected government

With the passage of the Act, Congress tightened screws on Cuba until the Papal
visit. After the Pope’s appeal to President Clinton, the United States showed a
change of heart. Increases in humanitarian transactions with Cuba were adopted, to
include contacts between the Cuban people and American citizens. Hence, the state
of Cuban-American relations took on a new twist. Domestic political consideration,
with respect to Cuban -American votes in Florida, a swing state in presidential
elections, might have persuaded President Bush not to undermine the Helms-Burton
Act, at least with executive orders. However, the visit of former President Jimmy
Carter to Cuba in 2002, and the subsequent pressures by agricultural interest groups
in the United States, eager to do business with Cuba posed at least, a temporary
challenge to the Bush policy on Cuban sanctions.
George W. Bush’s foreign policy attitude was not only to prolong the life of
the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, but, to strengthen its provisions and enforcement.
The rigidity and hostility of the George W. Bush’s policy toward Cuba was best
symbolized by America’s outright rejection of Cuba’s humanitarian gesture to send
Cuban doctors to New Orleans, Louisiana, to assist in the rescue of victims of
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.
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Under President Barack Obama, American relation with Cuba significantly
improved with the exchange of goods and people between the United States and
Cuba. Hence, it was not a surprise that Cuba offered to open its airspace for
American over-flights in its rescue operations in Haiti after the January 2010
earthquakes. America’s tacit acceptance of this goodwill gesture was another
indication of a steady and improving relation between Cuba and the United States.
While the relaxation of American embargo to Cuba has been incremental, it is now
likely for domestic political consideration to allow a total lift of American sanction
against Cuba. This is because the public opinion among young Cuban immigrants
in the United States has shifted in favor of establishing contact with Cuba. Even
though total lifting of embargo against Cuba would require the act of Congress of
the United States, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba under
robust “public diplomacy” (communication and interaction between Cuban and
American citizens that are intended to inform and influence), coupled with
overwhelming public opinion in favor of U.S.-Cuban rapprochement would likely
sustain this policy initiative.
Therefore, it is safe to say that although Helms-Burton Act was not completely
repealed or erased during Obama’s tenure because it was not undone through
legislation. Nevertheless, Obama succeeded in chipping away at its provisions. But,
the progress toward full restoration of diplomatic ties between the United States and
Cuba appeared somewhat safeguarded when the restoration of diplomat relations
came to fruition on July 20, 2015. However, the election of President Donald Trump
in a divided government, where Republican Party controls both Houses of Congress
and the White House appears to threaten U.S.-Cuba relations. It will be relatively
easy for the president to roll back the progress made so far by Obama in furtherance
of U.S.-Cuba relations. It was not possible for President Obama to lift the
congressional embargo against Cuba because of the strong opposition in congress
and that of many Cuban- Americans who constitute a major voting bloc in an
important and swing state of Florida. Thus, President Obama relied heavily on the
use of executive authority such as “executive order” to further open up U.S.-Cuba
ties around trade, banking, telecommunication, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and
travel. This mode of action did not require the approval of congress. The election
of President Trump constitutes a setback for U.S.-Cuba relations as his
administration is set and bent on reversing all the progress and improvements made
under Obama, a talking point he adopted during his election campaigns. With his
presidency in a “one-party” government, it would be easy for Trump to advance
legislation against Obama’s Cuban foreign policy reforms. Time will tell what the
future of U.S.-Cuba relations would look like. In the meantime, all we can do is to
keep our fingers crossed and watch.
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